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Abstract—Modern operating systems such as Android, iOS,
Windows Phone, and Chrome OS support a cooperating program
abstraction. Instead of placing all functionality into a single
program, programs cooperate to complete tasks requested by
users. However, untrusted programs may exploit interactions
with other programs to obtain unauthorized access to system
sensors either directly or through privileged services. Researchers
have proposed that programs should only be authorized to access
system sensors on a user-approved input event, but these methods
do not account for possible delegation done by the program
receiving the user input event. Furthermore, proposed delegation
methods do not enable users to control the use of their input
events accurately. In this paper, we propose ENTRUST, a system
that enables users to authorize sensor operations that follow their
input events, even if the sensor operation is performed by a
program different from the program receiving the input event.
ENTRUST tracks user input as well as delegation events and
restricts the execution of such events to compute unambiguous
delegation paths to enable accurate and reusable authorization of
sensor operations. To demonstrate this approach, we implement
the ENTRUST authorization system for Android. We find, via a
laboratory user study, that attacks can be prevented at a much
higher rate (54-64% improvement); and via a field user study,
that ENTRUST requires no more than three additional authoriza-
tions per program with respect to the first-use approach, while
incurring modest performance (<1%) and memory overheads
(5.5 KB per program).
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern operating systems support a programming abstrac-
tion that enables programs to cooperate to perform user
commands. Indeed, an emergent property of modern operating
systems is that applications are relatively simple, provide a
specific functionality, and often rely on the cooperation with
other programs to perform a larger task. For instance, modern
operating systems now ship with powerful voice-controlled
personal assistants that are entitled to interface with other
programs, reaching for a new horizon in human-computer
interaction.
Unfortunately, these assistants are valuable targets for ad-
versaries. Indeed, real-world scenarios have demonstrated how
voice-controlled personal assistants are vulnerable to informa-
tion leaks [19], [5]. Likewise, researchers have shown how
simple voice commands, either audible or inaudible, can be
used to control personal assistants and mislead them in various
ways [46], [9], [3], [35]. Just to mention one of the most recent
cases, a ride-sharing app took advantage of an entitlement
provided by a service part of Apple iOS, as recently reported
by Gizmodo [8]. Whenever users asked their voice assistants
“Siri, I need a ride”, the assistant launched the ride-sharing
app. Leveraging the entitlement provided by the service, the
app requested recording of users’ screens, even while running
in the background. The ride-sharing app abused this service
to spy on users, while they were taking a ride.
However, voice assistants are just one type of application
that may be exploited by such types of attacks. Several
real-world incidents have been reported to the public, where
malicious apps, able to track and spy on users by stealthily
opening smartphones’ cameras, microphones, and GPS re-
ceivers, made their way through official stores such as the
Apple App Store and the Google Play Store, after bypassing
strict pre-publishing security analyses [25], [16], [44], [1]. In
such attacks, the user is victimized when adversaries obtain
unauthorized access to the user’s data by tricking a voice
assistant to use an untrusted program or by tricking the user
into interacting with malicious programs.
Researchers have proposed methods that enable users to
authorize how programs may access system sensors by bind-
ing user input events to sensor operations [38], [37], [33],
[34], [31], but these methods do not account for programs
enlisting other programs to perform sensor operations. Thus,
programs that receive user input events may exploit or be
exploited by cooperating programs to perform unauthorized
sensor operations. Other studies focused on mechanisms to
regulate Inter-Process Communication (IPC), which can track
and control delegations [7], [20], [15], [29], [28], [2]; however,
these mechanism are unable to account for the user’s intention
for the input events that they generate. As a result, malicious
programs may trick users to perform unauthorized sensor
operations.
In this work, we propose the ENTRUST authorization system
to prevent malicious programs from exploiting cooperating
programs to obtain unauthorized access to system sensors. The
main challenge is to connect user input events made to one
program to sensor operation requests made by another program
unambiguously. To do this, ENTRUST tracks user input events
and inter-process communications to construct a delegation
graph that ENTRUST uses for authorizing each sensor op-
eration request. On a sensor operation request, ENTRUST
uses the delegation graph to compute the delegation path
from the program making the operation request back to the
program that elicited the original user input event, and presents
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Fig. 1: Possible attack vectors when considering diverse programs interacting in a cooperating model.
that path to the user for authorization of these programs.
ENTRUST leverages the insight that user input events are
relatively infrequent, processed much more quickly than users
can generate distinct events, and are higher priority than other
processing, to delay events that may result in multiple feasible
delegation paths. ENTRUST then reuses authorizations for
delegation paths to reduce user authorization effort. Thus,
ENTRUST enables users to ensure that their expectations are
met, even if a group of programs collaborate to process a user
command by using sensor data [18], [22].
We implement and evaluate a prototype of the ENTRUST
authorization system on a recent version of the Android
operating system, and find that ENTRUST prevents three attack
vectors possible in systems supporting cooperating programs,
requires little additional user effort, and has low overhead in
performance and memory consumption. In a laboratory user
study involving 44 human subjects, ENTRUST reduces users’
failure to detect attacks by 54-64% when compared to first-use
authorization. In a field user study involving 9 human subjects,
we found that users required no more than three additional
manual authorizations per program. Lastly, we measured the
overhead imposed by ENTRUST via benchmarks and found
that programs operate effectively under ENTRUST, while
incurring a negligible performance overhead and a memory
footprint of only 5.5 kilobytes, on average, per program based
on macro-benchmarks.
In summary, in this paper we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We identify three types of attack vectors exploitable
by malicious programs attempting to gain unauthorized
access to system sensors by leveraging cooperation with
other programs.
• We propose ENTRUST, an authorization system that
computes unambiguous delegation paths, from programs
eliciting user input events to programs requesting sensor
operations. As such, ENTRUST enables users to autho-
rize sensor operations resulting from those delegations
and systems to reuse those authorizations for repeated
requests.
• We implement the ENTRUST prototype and test its ef-
fectiveness with a laboratory-based user study, the users’
authorization effort with a field-based user study, and
performance and memory overhead via benchmarks.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Users initiate actions targeting system sensors without hav-
ing control over which programs are going to service their
requests. After users authorize programs to perform sensor
operations via first-use authorization, users have no control
over when programs are going to use permissions to perform
sensor operations in the future. Unfortunately, this lack of
control can lead to privacy violations when such operations
target system sensors, such as cameras, microphones, GPS
receivers, or the content displayed on users’ screens. For
instance, in first-use authorization, users have choices about
what programs they install and what permission they grant;
however, after first-use, programs are free to do whatever they
want with the acquired permissions and use them whenever
they want. A step forward was made with the introduction of
runtime permissions, which allow users to revoke programs’
permissions after installation. Unfortunately, users have still no
visibility of which programs apply their permissions following
a user input event and when programs use granted permissions.
Thus, realizing when programs abuse granted permissions, to
decide whether to revoke them, remains a challenge for users.
Due to the lack of control over what happens between user
input events and the resulting operation requests, malicious
programs may leverage the following three attack vectors.
For consistency, we will present the attack scenarios in terms
of voice assistants receiving user input events via voice
commands; however, similar attack scenarios are possible for
input events received by programs via graphical user interface
widgets rendered on the screen.
Confused Deputy — A malicious program may leverage a
user input event as an opportunity to confuse a more privileged
program into performing a dangerous action, as in the ride-
sharing case mentioned above. However, other scenarios are
possible. For instance, a third-party voice assistant app1 may
be maliciously calling the screen capture service every time
that a user requests to create a voice note. The malicious app
may therefore succeed in tricking the screen capture service
to capture and leak sensitive information (e.g., a credit card
number written down in a note). All the user can see is the
new note created by the notes app. This is an instance of a
confused deputy attack in a cooperating scenario, as depicted
on the left side of Figure 1.
Trojan Horse — A program trusted by the user may
delegate the received input to another program able to perform
the requested action. For instance, a trusted voice assistant may
activate a camera app to serve the user request to take a selfie.
However, the camera app may be a Trojan horse app that takes
a picture, but also records a short audio via the microphone,
1There exist over 250 voice assistant apps on Google Play developed by unknown
app developers.
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and the user location via GPS (e.g., a spy app2 installed by a
jealous boyfriend stalking on his girlfriend). All the user can
see is the picture being taken by the camera app. This is an
instance of a Trojan horse attack in a cooperating scenario, as
shown in the middle of Figure 1.
Man-In-The-Middle — A program trusted by the user may
be leveraged to spoof the user into initiating an interaction
with an unintended program. For instance, a legitimate banking
app may leverage the voice interaction intent mechanism3 to
allow clients to launch the banking app by asking their voice
assistant to “deposit check.” However, a malicious program
may define a similar voice interaction, such as “deposit bank
check,” with the voice assistant. Therefore, what would happen
is that whenever the user instantiates the “deposit bank check”
voice command, although the user expects the legitimate
banking app to be activated, the malicious app is activated
instead. The malicious app opens the camera, captures a
frame with the check, and finally sends a spoofed intent to
launch the legitimate banking app, all while running in the
background. All the user can see is the trusted banking app
opening a camera preview to take a picture of the check. This
is an instance of a man-in-the-middle attack in a cooperating
scenario, as shown on the right side of Figure 1. This is
only one of several ways a user can be spoofed. Indeed,
researchers have reported several ways programs can steal and
spoof intents [2], [7], [17], [23], [24].
Mechanisms solely based on permissions [15], [14], [13],
[43] to regulate access to system sensors are not sufficient to
prevent these attack vectors. First, a malicious program may
leverage trusted programs as confused deputy, thus exploiting
the deputies’ permissions. Second, the malicious program
may abuse already granted permissions. For instance, it is
reasonable to grant a camera app permission to access the
device camera, the microphone, and geo-location information.
However, it is less acceptable for this camera app to access
the geo-location information and the microphone when the
user only intended to take a selfie.
Prior work binds user inputs to programs’ access to system
sensors [38], [37], [31], [33], [34] to prevent programs from
stealthily accessing sensors or from performing operations
different from those intended by the users. However, they
are unable to track delegations that may follow user input
events. Furthermore, prior work that studied mechanisms to
track Inter-Process Communication (IPC) [7], [20], [29], [28],
[2] may enforce policies to prevent hijacking or stealing of
intents. However, policies may be incomplete (e.g., unable to
account for unexpected interactions) and unable to account
for the user’s intention in diverse scenarios. Also, mechanisms
focused on preventing permission re-delegation [15], whenever
a program with more permissions services other programs’
requests, are too restrictive and inadequate for systems where
programs are meant to cooperate to serve requests from users.
2One of the many spy/surveillance mobile apps available for purchase online (e.g.,
flexispy.com).
3Add Voice Interactions to Your App (https://codelabs.developers.google.com/)
Lastly, mechanisms based on taint analysis [11], [4], [42],
[20] or Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) [27],
[26] are able to, respectively, track and control how sensi-
tive data is used by or shared between programs; however,
such mechanisms solve the orthogonal problem of controlling
sensitive data leakage. They do not solve the problem of
establishing whether access to system sensors leads to sensitive
data that users think would cause privacy violations.
Security Guarantee: To block the attack vectors described
above, we must design a defense mechanism able to provide
the following security guarantee:
Any sensor operation must be initiated by a program
receiving a user input event, directly or indirectly through IPC,
and the user must authorize the entire sequence of involved
programs, from the one that received the user input event to
the one requesting the sensor operation.
III. SECURITY MODEL
Trust Model – We assume that the system (e.g., Linux
kernel, operating system, system services, and device drivers)
is booted securely, runs approved code from device vendors,
and is free of malice. We assume that user-level programs (e.g.,
applications) are isolated from each other via the sandboxing
mechanism using separated processes [36], [6]. We assume
that, by default, user-level programs have no direct access
to system sensors due to the use of a Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) policy [41], [40] enforced from boot time. We
assume the use of trusted paths, protected by MAC, allowing
users to receive unforgeable communications from the system,
and providing unforgeable user input events to the system.
These assumptions are in line with existing research proposing
trusted paths and trusted user interfaces for browsers [45], X
window systems [47], [39], and mobile operating systems [21].
Threat Model – We assume that users may install programs
from unknown sources (potentially malicious), then grant such
programs access to system sensors at first-use. Despite the
default isolation via sandboxing, programs may communicate
via message passing mechanisms (i.e., intents or broadcast
messages). Thus, user-level programs (e.g., applications) may
leverage such communication to exploit any of the three attack
vectors described in Section II and depicted in Figure 1.
Our objective is to regulate how cooperating programs access
system sensors. How programs manage and share the data
collected from system sensors is outside the scope of our
research. Our objective is not to prevent data leakage from
or denial of service by compromised or colluding programs.
Researchers have already examined solutions to prevent data
leakage based on taint analysis [11], [4], [42], [20] and
decentralized information flow control [27], [26].
IV. ENTRUST APPROACH OVERVIEW
ENTRUST restricts when a program may perform a sensor
operation by requiring each sensor operation to be unambigu-
ously associated with a user input event and an authorization
for that sensor operation, even if the sensor operation is
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Fig. 2: ENTRUST authorization method: user input events, handoff
events, and sensor operations are linked via delegation graphs to
compute unambiguous delegation paths for user authorization of
sensor operations.
performed by a program different from the one receiving the
user input event.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the ENTRUST authoriza-
tion system, which consists of five steps. In the first three
steps, ENTRUST mediates and records user input events, inter-
process communication events (handoff events), and sensor
operation requests, respectively, to construct a delegation
graph. All of these steps are performed in a manner to ensure
that user input events can be associated unambiguously with
sensor operation requests. In the fourth step, ENTRUST uses
the constructed delegation graph to compute an unambiguous
delegation path from the input event to the sensor operation
request. Unless the authorization cache contains a user autho-
rization for this delegation path already, the fifth step elicits an
authorization for the delegation path from the user, and caching
of user authorizations for later use for the same delegation
path.
Fig. 3: Delegation graphs connect input events with operation requests
for sensors via handoff events.
ENTRUST connects sensor operation requests to user input
events via handoffs by constructing a delegation graph to
record such operations, as shown in Figure 3. A delegation
graph is a graph, G = (V,E), where the vertices, v ∈ V ,
represent user input events, programs, or system sensors and
the edges (u, v) ∈ E represent the flow of user input events
to programs and system sensors. Figure 3 shows a simple
flow, whereby a user input event i is delivered to a program
pi that performs a handoff event h to a program pj , which
performs an operation request r for sensor s. Thus, there
are three types of edges: user input event to program (user
input delivery), program to program (handoff), and program
to sensor operation request (request delivery).
Upon a sensor operation request, ENTRUST elicits an ex-
plicit user authorization for the path in the delegation graph
associated with the user input event that led to the operation
request, called the delegation path. ENTRUST finds the exact
delegation path by traversing the delegation graph backwards
from the operation request to the user input event that led to
the request. The identified delegation path can be expressed
in simple natural language, similar to first-use authorizations,
and we assess how the user utilizes delegation paths to produce
authorizations in a user study in Section VII-A1.
Critical to computing delegation paths is the ability for
ENTRUST to find an unambiguous reverse path from the sensor
operation request back to a user input event. There are two
main challenges. First, a program may receive multiple user
input events, so it may be ambiguous as to which user input
event led to a handoff and/or sensor operation request. Second,
a program may receive multiple handoffs from other programs
and it may be ambiguous which input event led to a sensor
operation request. In particular, a delegation path is said to be
unambiguous, if and only if given an operation request r for a
sensor s in program pj , it is possible to identify a single user
input event i for program pj that preceded it or it is possible
to identify a single path pi → pj in the delegation graph and
pi receives a single input input i. Without requiring changes
to system APIs and program code to use them, resolving such
ambiguities at the system level is not practical, unless some
restrictions are enforced on how programs operate.
Our insight is based on the recognition that user input
events are relatively infrequent, processed much more quickly
than users can generate them, and higher priority than other
processing. Thus, we design ENTRUST to enforce restrictions
to prevent the creation of ambiguities in delegation graphs.
First, we limit programs to receive only one input event at a
time. That is, from the time that a user input event is received
by a program until the completion of processing resulting from
that input, no other distinct user input events may be delivered
to that program.4 Second, to determine when processing must
complete, we bound processing time from the initial delivery
of a user input event based on the amount of time needed
for users to generate the next user input event. We observe
and measure, as described in Section V-B, that distinct user
input events can only be created at a much slower rate than
sensor operation processing. Third, to resolve ambiguities due
to handoffs, we restrict receivers of a handoff, originating from
a user input event, to only one active handoff event. While this
may sound like a big lock over programs, we mitigate this
impact by prioritizing handoffs from user input events over
others to ”get them out of the way.” Fortunately, this approach
complies with typical scheduling expectations that I/O events
are prioritized over CPU events.
V. ENTRUST AUTHORIZATION DESIGN
In this section, we describe a method for authorizing del-
egated sensor operations. This method solves three problems.
First, ENTRUST tracks user input events, handoff events,
and sensor operation requests to build delegation graphs
(Section V-A). Second, ENTRUST computes delegation paths
between any user input event and any sensor operation request
unambiguously (Section V-B). Third, ENTRUST enables users
to authorize constructed delegation paths while approximating
the first-use authorization in terms of user effort (Section V-C).
4The same type of user input event may be delivered, but it must result in the same
delegation path.
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A. Building Delegation Graphs
We start by defining the basic methods used by ENTRUST
to mediate user input events, handoff events, and sensor
operation requests necessary to construct delegation graphs
rooted at input events.
First, for each user input event for a program pi, ENTRUST
creates an input event tuple i = (w, pi, ti), where w is
the widget used to produce the event (including the user
interface context, based on prior work [34]); pi is the program
displaying its graphical user interface on the screen, thus,
receiving the input event; and ti is the time of the user
input event (step 1 in Figure 2). ENTRUST is designed to
mediated both user input events via GUI widgets as well as
voice commands. Voice commands are translated into speech
by leveraging the Google Cloud Speech-to-Text service.
Second, after receiving the user input event i, program
pi may handoff the event to another program pj . ENTRUST
mediates handoff events by intercepting spawned intents and
messages exchanged between programs [12]. Thus, ENTRUST
models the handoff event at time tj as a tuple h = (pi, pj , tj),
where: pi is the program delegating the input event, pj is
the program receiving the event, and tj is the time the event
delegation occurred (step 2 in Figure 2).
Third, when the program pj generates a sensor operation
request r, ENTRUST models it as a tuple r = (pj , o, s, tk),
where pj is the program requesting the sensor operation, o
is the type of sensor operation requested, s is the target
sensor, and tk is the time the sensor operation request occurred
(step 3 in Figure 2).
Lastly, ENTRUST links together all the mediated events to
construct a delegation graph G = (V,E), where the v ∈ V
represents an input event, program, or system sensor; whereas
(u, v) ∈ E represents the delivery of user input events,
handoffs, and operation requests.
B. Ensuring Unambiguous Delegation Paths
Upon mediation of a sensor request r, ENTRUST computes
the associated delegation path by tracing backwards from the
sensor request to the original user input event i. Hence, the
operation request r = (pj , o, s, tk) above causes a delegation
path: (w, pi, ti) → (pi, pj , tj) → (pj , o, s, tk) to be reported in
step 4 in Figure 2. Delegation paths are then presented to
the user for authorization as described in Section V-C.
Fig. 4: Two scenarios that create ambiguity. Multiple input events or
handoff events delivered to the same program.
However, ambiguity is possible in the computation of a
delegation path. We identify two causes of ambiguity. First,
ambiguity is possible if the same program pi receives multiple
input events and performs a handoff, as depicted by the left
side of Figure 4. In this case, it is unclear which one of
the input events resulted in the handoff. Second, ambiguity
is possible if the same program pj receives multiple handoff
events before performing a sensor operation request, as de-
picted by the right side of Figure 4. In this case, it is unclear
which handoff is associated with a subsequent sensor operation
request.
To prevent these ambiguous cases, we leverage the insights
that user input events are relatively infrequent, processed
much more quickly than users can generate them, and higher
priority than other processing. We leverage these insights
to produce a method that ensures sensor operation requests
can be connected to user input events unambiguously. We
first describe how to prevent ambiguity for user input events,
then we extend the mechanism to handoff events. Also, we
leverage scheduling to prevent the proposed mechanism from
being used for denial of service attacks against user input
event processing. We evaluate the performance impact of our
proposed solution in Section VII-C.
Ambiguity Prevention Mechanism: User Input Events –
We observe that the time between distinct user input events is
much larger than the time needed to produce the corresponding
operation request. If every user input event results in an
operation request before the user can even produce another
distinct user input event, then no ambiguous paths can be
generated. Thus, we propose to set a time limit for each input
event, such that the difference between the time at which a
user input event is generated ti and the time for any sensor
operation request – based on that input event – must be below
that limit for the event to be processed.
Note that repeated user input events (e.g., by holding down
a button) are allowed since these repeated user input events
generate the same delegation path. Hence, the sequence of
sensor operations will be allowed after the delegation path
is authorized by the user. Should the programs produce a
different delegation path in the middle of a sequence of
operations spawned in this manner, then ENTRUST would
require a new authorization for the new delegation path, as
described in Section V-C.
Ambiguity Prevention Mechanism: Handoff Events –
Ambiguity prevention for handoff events is more subtle, but
builds on the approach used to prevent ambiguity for input
events. Figure 5 shows the key challenge. Suppose a malicious
program pk tries to ”steal” a user authorization for a program
pj to perform a sensor operation by submitting handoff event
that will be processed concurrently to the handoff event from
another program pi that received a input event. Should a
sensor operation request occur, ENTRUST cannot determine
whether the sensor request from pj is to process hi or hk,
so it cannot determine the delegation path unambiguously
to authorize the request. If ENTRUST knows the mapping
between actions associated to handoff events and whether they
are linked to sensor operations (possible if pj is a trusted
service), ENTRUST can block the handoff from pk. If so, the
method to delay input events described above prevents such
attacks. However, ENTRUST may not know this mapping for
third-party apps.
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Fig. 5: A program pk attempts leveraging the input event received
from program pi to get program pj to generate an operation request.
Thus, we extend the defense for input events to prevent
ambiguity. When a target program is sent a handoff event
associated with a user input event, then ENTRUST delays
delivery of that event until the target program has completed
processing any other handoff events. Once the target program
has begun processing a handoff associated with a user input
event, ENTRUST prevents the delivery of subsequent handoff
events until this processing completes.
Conceptually, this approach is analogous to placing a
readers-writers lock over programs that may receive handoffs
that result from user input events. To avoid starving user input
events (e.g., delaying them until the time limit), we prioritize
delivery of handoffs that derive from user input events ahead of
other handoffs using a simple, two-level scheduling approach.
We assess the impact of the proposed ambiguity prevention
mechanisms on existing programs’ functionality and perfor-
mance in Section VII-C.
C. Authorizing Delegation Paths
For controlling when a sensor operation may be performed
as the result of a user input event, users are the only parties
that know the intent of their actions. Therefore, users must
be the party to make the final authorization decisions. To
achieve this objective, ENTRUST elicits an explicit user autho-
rization every time that a new delegation path is constructed
(step 5 in Figure 2). Hence, to express a delegation path
comprehensively, ENTRUST builds an authorization request
that specifies: the user input event, all the programs that
performed handoff events emanating from the user input event
in the delegation path, the program performing the operation
request, the operation to be performed, and the target sensor of
the operation. As a result, all the programs that receive sensor
data are clearly identified and reported in the authorization
message, along with the input event, handoff events, and the
resulting sensor operation.
To reduce the user authorization effort, ENTRUST caches
authorized delegation paths for reuse. After storing an au-
thorized delegation path, ENTRUST proceeds in allowing
the authorized sensor operation. For subsequent instances of
the same user input event that results in exactly the same
delegation path, which enables ENTRUST to omit step 5 and
automatically authorize the sensor operation by leveraging the
cached authorization. Hence, ENTRUST requires an explicit
user’s authorization only the first time a delegation path is
constructed for a specific user input event, similarly to the first-
use permission approach. As long as the program receiving
a user input event does not change the way it processes
that event (i.e., same handoffs), no further user authorization
will be necessary. In Section VII-A1, we show that such
an approach does not prohibitively increase the number of
access control decisions that users have to make thus avoiding
decision fatigue [14].
Lastly, should a new delegation path be identified for a
user input event that has a cached delegation path, then
ENTRUST invalidates the cached delegation path and requires
user authorization for the newly constructed delegation path
before associating it to such an input event and caching it.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype of the ENTRUST authorization
system by modifying a recent release of the Android OS
(Android-7.1.1 r3) available via the Android Open Source
Project (AOSP).5 The choice of implementing a ENTRUST
prototype for the Android OS was guided by its open-source
nature and its wide adoption. Its footprint is about 550 SLOC
in C, 830 SLOC in C++, and 770 SLOC in Java.
Program Identification – To prove the programs’ identity
to users, ENTRUST specifies both the programs’ name and
visual identity mark (e.g., icon) in every delegation request as
shown in Figure 6. ENTRUST retrieves programs’ identity by
accessing the AndroidManifest.xml, which must contain
a unique name and a unique identity mark (e.g., icon) for
the program package. ENTRUST verifies programs’ identity
via the crypto-checksum6 of the program’s binary signed with
the developer’s private key and verifiable with the developer’s
public key [48], similarly to proposed in prior work [49],
[34]. ENTRUST crosschecks developers’ signatures and apps’
identity (i.e., names and logos) by pulling information from
the official Google Play store.7
User Input Event Authentication – ENTRUST leverages
SEAndroid [40] to ensure that programs cannot inject in-
put events by directly writing into input device files (i.e.,
/dev/input/*) corresponding to hardware and software
input interfaces attached to the mobile platform. Hence, only
device drivers can write into input device files and only the
Android Input Manager, a trusted system service, can read
such device files and dispatch input events to programs. Also,
ENTRUST leverages the Android screen overlay mechanism
to block overlay of graphical user interface components and
prevent hijacking of user input events. Lastly, ENTRUST ac-
cepts only voice commands that are processed by the Android
System Voice Actions module.8 ENTRUST authenticates user
input events by leveraging sixteen mediation hooks placed
inside the stock Android Input Manager and six mediation
hooks placed inside the System Voice Actions module.
Handoff Event Mediation – Programs communicate with
each other via Inter-Component Communication (ICC) that,
in Android, is implemented as part of the Binder IPC mecha-
nisms. The ICC includes both intent and broadcast messages
that can be exchanged among programs. The Binder and
5https://source.android.com
6Android requires all apps and services to be signed by their developers.
7https://play.google.com
8https://developers.google.com/voice-actions/
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the Activity Manager regulate messages exchanged among
programs via the intent API.9 Programs can also send intents
to other programs or services by using the broadcast mech-
anism that allows sending intents as arguments in broadcast
messages. The Activity Manager routes intents to broadcast
receivers based on the information contained in the intents
and the broadcast receivers that have registered their interest
in the first place. To mediate intents and broadcast messages
exchanged between programs completely, ENTRUST leverages
eight mediation hooks placed inside the Activity Manager and
the Binder.
Sensor Operation Mediation – Android uses the Hardware
Abstraction Layer (HAL) interface to allow only system
services and privileged processes to access system sensors
indirectly via a well-defined API exposed by the kernel.
Moreover, SEAndroid [40] is used to ensure that only system
services can communicate with the HAL at runtime. Any
other program (e.g., apps) must interact with such system
services to request execution of operations targeting system
sensors. ENTRUST leverages such a mediation layer to identify
operation requests generated by programs, by placing twelve
hooks inside the stock Android Audio System, Media Server,
Location Services, and Media Projection.
Event Scheduling – In Android, the Event Hub (part of
the Input Manager server) reads raw input events from the
input device driver files (/dev/input/*) and delivers them
to the Input Reader. The Input Reader then formats the raw
data and creates input event data that is delivered to the Input
Dispatcher. The Input Dispatcher then consults the Window
Manager to identify the target program based on the activity
window currently displayed on the screen. Hence, we en-
hanced the Input Dispatcher to hold - for the duration of a time
window - incoming input events for a target program should
there be already a delivered input event for such a program
that has not been processed yet. For handoff events, instead,
the Binder is the single point of communication between two
isolated programs trying to communicate view Inter-Process
Communication (IPC). Therefore, the Binder has knowledge of
all the pending messages exchanged between programs in the
system and of the identity of the two communicating parties.
Hence, we enhanced the Binder to hold - for the duration
of a time window - incoming handoff events for a target
program should the program be already involved in another
communication with a third program. Lastly, ENTRUST adopt
a per-program two-level queue scheduling, where events that
can be tracked back to an input event have a higher priority.
All other events are held in the lower priority queue.
Delegation Graph Management – The ENTRUST proto-
type implements the ENTRUST MONITOR to handle callbacks
from the ENTRUST hooks inside the Input Manager, Activity
Manager, Binder, and other system services. The ENTRUST
MONITOR is notified of mediated events (e.g., input events,
handoff events, and operation requests) via a callback mecha-
9https://developer.android.com
Fig. 6: Authorization message
prompted by ENTRUST to users
the first time delegation paths are
created. Users are made aware of all
the programs cooperating in serving
their requests, as well as, of the
entire delegation paths. Also, users
are prompted with programs’ names
and identity marks to ease their
identification. ENTRUST crosschecks
developers’ signatures and apps’
identity (i.e., names and logos) by
pulling information from the official
Google Play store.
nism. Also, the ENTRUST MONITOR implements the logic for
the delegation graph construction, caching, and enforcement.
Authorization Message Management – The ENTRUST
MONITOR displays authorization messages to users for ex-
plicit authorizations of delegation paths, as shown in Figure
6. Also, ENTRUST prevents apps from creating windows
that overlap the ENTRUST MONITOR messages by leveraging
the Android screen overlay protection mechanism. ENTRUST
implements the Compartmented Mode Workstation model
[50], by using isolated per-window processes forked from the
Window Manager, to prevent unauthorized modification of
messages from the ENTRUST MONITOR by other programs.
VII. ENTRUST EVALUATION
We investigated the following research questions:
I To what degree is the ENTRUST authorization assisting
users in avoiding confused deputy, Trojan horse, and man-
in-the-middle attacks? We performed a laboratory-based user
study and found that ENTRUST significantly increased (from
54-64% improvement) the ability of participants in avoiding
attacks.
I What is the decision overhead imposed by ENTRUST on
users due to explicit authorization of constructed delegation
graphs? We performed a field-based user study and found
that the number of decisions imposed on users by ENTRUST
remained confined to no more than 4 explicit authorizations
per program.
I Is ENTRUST backward compatible with existing pro-
grams? How many operations from legitimate programs are
incorrectly blocked by ENTRUST? We used a well-known
compatibility test suite to evaluate the compatibility of EN-
TRUST with 1,000 apps (selected among the most popular apps
on Google Play) and found that ENTRUST does not cause the
failure of any application.
I What is the performance overhead imposed by ENTRUST
for the delegation graph construction and enforcement? We
used a well-known software exerciser to measure the per-
formance overhead imposed by ENTRUST. We found that
ENTRUST introduced a negligible overhead (order of millisec-
onds) unlikely noticeable to users.
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Task Directive Attack Scenario Delegation Graph First-Use EnTrust
T
A
S
K
A
Ask Smart
Assistant to
“create a
note.” Dictate
a voice note
to Notes.
Confused Deputy: Smart
Assistant opens the Notes
app and adds the specified
note, however, it also sends
a request to the Screen
Capture service to capture
the content on the screen.
A note containing the
credit card information of a
purchasing card is captured
from the Notes app and
sent to a remote server.
Smart Assistant will start capturing everything
that’s displayed on your screen.
Group-FR-U(nprimed)Group-FR-P(rimed)
81% Attack Success 55% Attack Success
55% Prompted 45% Prompted
36% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
In response to your voice command “create a
note”, allow Smart Assistant to activate the
Screen Capture service to capture the content
on the screen?
Group-EN-U(nprimed)Group-EN-P(rimed)
27% Attack Success 0% Attack Success
100% Prompted 100% Prompted
27% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
T
A
S
K
B
Ask Google
Assistant to
“take a selfie.”
Trojan Horse: Google
Assistant activates the
Basic Camera app, which
is a Trojan app that takes a
selfie but also records a
short audio and the user’s
location. The collected data
is then sent to a remote
server accessible by the
adversary.
Allow Basic Camera to capture pictures?
Allow Basic Camera to record audio?
Allow Basic Camera to access this device’s
location?
Group-FR-U(nprimed)Group-FR-P(rimed))
81% Attack Success 55% Attack Success
36% Prompted 45% Prompted
18% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
In response to your voice command “take a
selfie”, allow Google Assistant to activate the
Basic Camera app to capture pictures,
record audio, and access the GPS receiver to
record your location?
Group-EN-U(nprimed)Group-EN-P(rimed)
18% Attack Success 0% Attack Success
100% Prompted 100% Prompted
18% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
T
A
S
K
C
Ask Google
Assistant to
“deposit bank
check.” After
logging into
Mobile
Banking with
the provided
credentials,
deposit the
provided
check.
Man-In-The-Middle:
Google Assistant launches
Basic Camera registered
for the voice intent
“deposit bank check”. The
Basic Camera runs in the
background, captures a
picture of the check and -
via a spoofed intent -
launches the Mobile
Banking app registered for
the voice intent “deposit
check”.
Allow Basic Camera to capture pictures?
Allow Mobile Banking to capture pictures?
Group-FR-U(nprimed)Group-FR-P(rimed)
73% Attack Success 55% Attack Success
45% Prompted 45% Prompted
18% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
In response to your voice command “deposit a
check,” allow Google Assistant to activate the
Basic Camera app to capture pictures. Also,
allow the Basic Camera app to activate the
Mobile Banking app to capture pictures?
Group-EN-U(nprimed)Group-EN-P(rimed)
9% Attack Success 0% Attack Success
100% Prompted 100% Prompted
9% Explicit Allows 0% Explicit Allows
TABLE I: Experimental tasks for the laboratory-based user study, derived from the attack vectors described in Section II. We report the
delegation graphs constructed by ENTRUST and the authorization messages presented to subjects in the four groups. Authorizations request
prompted by ENTRUST include programs’ identity marks, as shown in Figure 6, omitted in this Table.
A. User Study Preliminaries
We designed our user studies following suggested practices
for human subject studies in security to avoid common pit-
falls in conducting and writing about security and privacy
human subject research [51]. Our study is comprehensive,
however, does not focus explicitly on long-term habituation.
In particular, researchers have studied user’s habituation for
first-use authorization systems extensively [14], [52] and our
field-based study (Section VII-A2) shows that our approach is
comparable to first-use in terms of the number of times users
are prompted. Therefore, we expect that results reported in
prior work should apply to our approach as well [14], [52].
Further, researchers have extensively studied peoples’ attitudes
toward privacy [33], [53], [54], therefore, we did not find
it interesting to measure users’ attitude toward privacy once
again during our studies. An Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval was obtained from our institution. We recruited user
study participants via local mailing lists, Craigslist, Twitter,
and local groups on Facebook. We compensated them with
a $5 gift card. We excluded acquaintances from participating
in the studies to avoid acquiescence bias. We made sure to
get a wide diversity of subjects, both in terms of age and
experience with technology. Participants were given the option
to withdraw their consent to participate at any time after the
purpose of the study was revealed. For all the experiments,
we configured the test environment on LG Google Nexus
5X phones running the Android 7.1 Nougat OS. We used a
background service, automatically relaunched at boot time, to
log participants’ responses to system messages and alerts, as
well as all user input events generated by participants while
interacting with the testing programs. During the experiments,
the researchers took note of comments made by participants.
1) Laboratory-Based User Study:
We performed a laboratory-based user study to evaluate
the effectiveness of ENTRUST in supporting users in avoiding
all the three attack vectors previously identified in Section II.
We compared ENTRUST with the first-use authorization used
in commercial systems. We could not compare mechanisms
proposed in related work [38], [37], [34], because they are
unable to handle handoff events. We divided participants into
four groups, participants in Group-FR-U and Group-FR-P
interacted with a stock Android OS implementing the first-
use authorization mechanism. Participants in Group-EN-U
and Group-EN-P interacted with a modified version of the
Android OS integrating the ENTRUST authorization system.
To account for the priming effect, we avoided influencing
subjects in Group-FR-U and Group-EN-U and advertised
the test as a generic “voice assistants testing” study without
mentioning security implications. On the other hand, to as-
sess the impact of priming, subjects in Group-FR-P and
Group-EN-P were informed that attacks targeting system
sensors (e.g., camera, microphone, and GPS receiver) were
possible during the interaction with programs involved in
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the experimental tasks, but without specifying what program
performed the attacks or what attacks were performed.
Experimental Procedures: For our experiments, we used
two voice assistant programs. The Smart Assistant is a test
assistant developed in our research lab that provides basic
virtual assistant functionality, such as voice search, message
composition, and note keeping. However, Smart Assistant is
also designed to perform confused deputy attacks on system
services, such as the Screen Capture service. The Google
Assistant, instead, is the benign assistant shipped with the
stock Android OS. We also used a test app, Basic Camera,
developed in our research lab. It provides basic camera func-
tionality, such as capturing pictures or videos and applying
photographic filters. However, Basic Camera is also designed
to perform man-in-the-middle and Trojan horse attacks for
requests to capture photographic frames. Lastly, we used a
legitimate Mobile Banking app (from a major international
bank) available on Google Play.
All the instructions to perform the experimental tasks were
provided to participants via a handout at the beginning of the
user study. Before starting the experimental tasks, we asked
the participants to familiarize themselves with the provided
smartphone, by interacting with the voice assistants and other
available programs. We will refer to this phase as the pre-
liminary phase. This phase is meant to avoid a “cold start”
and approximate a scenario in which the users have been
using their device. During this phase, all the participants were
prompted with authorization requests at first-use of any of
the system sensors. Afterwards, all participants were asked
to perform, in a randomized order, the three experimental
tasks reported in Table I. Each participant was presented with
the corresponding authorization messages reported in Table I
depending on the group to which they were assigned.10
Experimental Results: In total, forty-four subjects partici-
pated in and completed our laboratory-based user study. We
randomly assigned 11 participants to each group. Table I
summarizes the results of the three experimental tasks. Overall,
we found that the delegation graphs constructed by ENTRUST
aided the participants in avoiding attacks. ENTRUST signif-
icantly outperformed the first-use approach currently used
in commercial systems. In fact, with the first-use approach
participants may not have been prompted with authorization
messages once again during the experimental tasks, should
they have authorized the program in a previous task or during
the preliminary phase as per first-use default. Instead, with
ENTRUST a new authorization message was presented to the
participants whenever a new delegation path was identified,
thus, making the delegation explicit to users. This explains
the lower attack success rates relative to the first-use groups.
TASK A : The analysis of subjects’ responses revealed
that 5 subjects from Group-FR-U and 6 subjects from
Group-FR-P had interacted with Smart Assistant during the
preliminary phase to “take a screenshot” and had granted the
10The runtime permission mechanism enabled subjects to revoke granted permissions
at any time.
app permission to capture the their screen. Thus, they were
not prompted once again with an authorization message during
Task A, as per default in first-use permissions. In addition, 4
subjects from Group-FR-U explicitly allowed Smart Assis-
tant to capture their screen, therefore, resulting in a 81% and
55% attack success, respectively, as reported in Table I. On the
contrary, only 3 subjects from Group-EN-U and no subjects
from Group-EN-P allowed the attack (27% and 0% attack
success, respectively). Also, similarly to what happened to
participants in Group-FR-U and Group-FR-P, 6 subjects
from Group-EN-U and 6 subjects from Group-EN-P had
interacted with Smart Assistant during the preliminary phase
and asked to “take a screenshot.” However, since the voice
command “create a note” was a different command, ENTRUST
prompted all the participants with a new authorization mes-
sage, as shown in Table I.
TASK B : The analysis of subjects’ responses revealed
that 7 subjects from Group-FR-U and 6 subjects from
Group-FR-P had interacted with Basic Camera to take
a picture or record a video, either during the preliminary
phase or during another task, and authorized it to capture
pictures, audio, and access the device’s location. Thus, they
were not prompted once again during this task as per de-
fault in first-use permissions. Also, we found that 2 subjects
from Group-FR-U explicitly authorized Basic Camera to
access the camera, as well as the microphone, and the GPS
receiver; therefore, resulting in a 81% and 55% attack suc-
cess, respectively. In contrast, 2 subjects from Group-EN-U
and no subject from Group-EN-P authorized access to
the camera, microphone, and GPS receiver (18% and 0%
attack success, respectively). Also, we found that 8 subjects
from Group-EN-U and 6 subjects from Group-EN-P had
interacted with Basic Camera during the preliminary phase
or during another task. However, none of them asked to
“take a selfie” before, so all participants were prompted by
ENTRUST with a new authorization message. At the end of
the experiment, among all the participants, when asked why
they had authorized access to the GPS receiver the majority
said that they expected a camera app to access location to
create geo-tag metadata while taking a picture. In contrast,
for those who had denied the permission, their reasoning was
that they did not feel comfortable sharing their location when
taking a selfie.
TASK C : The analysis of subjects’ responses revealed
that 6 subjects form Group-FR-U and 6 subjects from
Group-FR-P had interacted with Basic Camera either during
the preliminary phase or during another task and authorized
the app to capture pictures. Thus, during this task, they were
not prompted with an authorization message once again as per
default in first-use permissions. They were only prompted to
grant permission to Mobile Banking, explaining why even the
primed subjects were not able to detect the attack. In addition,
2 subjects from Group-FR-U explicitly authorized Basic
Camera to capture a frame with the bank check; therefore,
resulting in a 73% and 55% attack success, respectively. On the
other hand, only 1 subject from Group-EN-U and no subjects
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from Group-EN-P had authorized Basic Camera to capture
a frame with the bank check, resulting in a 9% and 0% attack
success, respectively. Notice that all the participants from
Group-EN-U and Group-EN-P were prompted with a new
authorization message by ENTRUST for the new command
“deposit bank check.” Interestingly, the one subject from
Group-EN-U, who had allowed Basic Camera to capture a
frame with the bank check, verbally expressed his concern
about the permission notification presented on the screen. The
subject stated observing that two apps asked permission to
access the camera to take pictures. This is not unreasonable
for an unprimed participant, who does not expect a malicious
behavior.
Discussion: By comparing the results from Group-FR-U
versus those from Group-FR-P, and those from
Group-EN-U versus those from Group-EN-P, we
observed that primed subjects allowed fewer attacks.
However, ENTRUST was significantly more effective than
first-use in keeping users “on guard” independently of whether
participants were primed (54-64% lower attack success with
ENTRUST). Indeed, differently from first-use or prior defense
mechanisms [34], [38], [37], ENTRUST was able to identify
whether pre-authorized programs attempted accessing system
sensors via unauthorized delegation paths, which could
potentially had affected users’ privacy and security. If so,
ENTRUST prompted users for an explicit authorization of
newly identified delegation paths. Also, ENTRUST performed
slightly better than first-use authorization for explicit user
authorizations (Explicit Allows in Table I). Thus, additional
information provided by ENTRUST in authorization messages
(i.e., programs’ name and identity mark, as well as, delegation
information, as shown in Figure 6), appears to be helpful to
users in avoiding unexpected behaviors from programs.
2) Field-Based User Study:
We performed a field-based user study to evaluate whether
ENTRUST increases the decision-overhead imposed on users.
We measured the number of explicit authorizations users had
to make when interacting with ENTRUST under realistic and
practical conditions, and compared it with the first-use ap-
proach adopted in commercial systems. We also measured the
number of authorizations handled by ENTRUST via the cache
mechanism that, transparently to users, granted authorized
operations.
Experimental Procedures: Participants were provided with
an LG Nexus 5X smartphone running a modified version
of the Android OS integrating the ENTRUST authorization
framework, and asked to use it for 7 days. During this period,
participants interacted with 5 voice assistants and 10 apps
selected among the most popular11 with up to millions of
downloads from the official Google Play store. Participants
were asked to explore each voice assistant and app at least
once by interacting as they would normally do. Particularly,
we asked the participants to interact with each voice assis-
tant by asking the following three questions: (1) “capture a
11Source: https://fortune.com
Explicit Authorizations
First-Use ENTRUST
Authorized
Operations (7 days)
Snapchat
YouTube
Facebook Messenger
Instagram
Facebook
Whatsapp
Skype
WeChat
Reddit
Bitmoji
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
1
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
1
3
276
84
93
393
117
76
100
101
18
127
Google Assistant
Microsoft Cortana
Amazon Alexa
Samsung Bixby
Lyra Virtual Assistant
1
1
1
1
1
4
3
4
4
3
72
49
84
63
56
TABLE II: Apps and voice assistants tested in the field study. The
last column shows the number of operations automatically authorized
by ENTRUST after user’s authorization.
screenshot,” (2) “record a voice note,” (3) “how long does it
take to drive back home.” Additionally, we asked participants
to be creative and ask three additional questions of their
choice. Mock accounts were provided to participants for apps
requiring a log-in. Table II summarizes all the assistants
and apps pre-installed on the smartphones for the field-based
user study. The smartphones provided to participants were
running a background service with runtime logging enabled,
automatically restarted at boot time, to monitor the number
of times each program was launched, the users’ input events,
the constructed delegation graphs, the authorization decisions
made by the participants, and the number of authorizations
automatically granted by ENTRUST. The background service
also measured the gaps between consecutive input events and
handoff events, as well as the time required by each program
to service each event.
Experimental Results: Nine subjects participated and com-
pleted the field-based user study. The data collected during our
experiment indicates that all user authorizations were obtained
within the first 72 hours of interaction with the experimental
device, after which we observed only operations automatically
granted by ENTRUST.
The first participant allowed us to discover two implementa-
tion issues that affected the number of explicit authorizations
required by ENTRUST. First, changing the orientation of
the screen (portrait versus landscape) was causing ENTRUST
to request a new explicit user authorization for an already
authorized widget whenever the screen orientation changed.
This inconvenience was due to the change in some of the
features used to model the context within which the widget
was presented. To address this shortcoming, we modified our
original prototype to force the Window Manager to generate
in memory two graphical user interfaces for both screen orien-
tations to allow ENTRUST to bind them with a specific widget
presented on the screen. Second, for the voice commands, we
noticed that differently phrased voice commands with the same
meaning would be identified as different user input events.
For instance, “take a selfie” and “take a picture of me”.
This shortcoming was causing ENTRUST to generate a new
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Fig. 7: Time analysis used to study the possibility of ambiguous
events delegation paths, as discussed in Section V-B.
delegation graph for each differently phrased voice command.
To address this issue, we leveraged the Dialogflow engine by
Google, part of the AI.API.12 Dialogflow is a development
suite for building conversational interfaces and provides a
database of synonyms to group together voice commands with
the same meaning. We fixed the two issues and continued our
experiment with the other participants.
Table II reports the average number of explicit authoriza-
tions performed by the participants. We compared them with
the number of explicit authorizations that would be necessary
if the first-use permission mechanism was used instead. The
results show that ENTRUST required the same number of
explicit authorizations by users for all the tested apps. For
all voice assistants, instead, ENTRUST may required up to
3 additional explicit authorizations when compared with the
first-use approach. These additional authorizations are due to
the fact that with the first-use approach the programs activated
by the voice assistant to serve the user request may have
already received the required permission to access the sensitive
sensors. ENTRUST instead captures the entire sequence of
events, from the user input event to any subsequent action
or operation request, and then ties them together. Therefore,
ENTRUST constructs a new graph for each different inter-
action. Nonetheless, the number of decisions imposed on
the users remains very modest. Indeed, on average, three
additional explicit user authorizations are required per each
voice assistant. Also, the number of explicit authorizations
made by the users remained a constant factor compared to
the number of automatically authorized operations, which
instead grew linearly over time. We measured an average of
16 operations automatically authorized by ENTRUST during
a 24-hour period (last column of Table II). Therefore, if we
consider the daily average number of automatically authorized
operations for a period of one year, we will have on the
order of thousands of operations automatically authorized by
ENTRUST, which would not require any additional explicit
effort for the users.
Time Constraints Analysis: We leveraged data collected via
the field-based user study to perform an analysis of time
constraints for input events and action/operation requests to
calibrate the time window for the event ambiguity prevention
mechanism (Section V-B). Figure 7 reports the measurements
12 https://dialogflow.com
of the gaps13 between consecutive input events and consecutive
handoff events, as well as the lags between each event and the
corresponding response from the serving program. From the
measurements, we observed: (1) the minimum gap between
subsequent input events targeting the same program (211 ms)
is an order of magnitude larger than the maximum lag required
by the program to serve each incoming event (22 ms); and
(2) the minimum gap (171 ms) between subsequent handoff
events targeting the same program is an order of magnitude
larger than the maximum lag required by the program to serve
incoming requests (15 ms). Hence, to avoid ambiguity, we may
set the time window to 150 ms to guarantee that the entire
delegation path can be identified before the next event for the
same program arrives. Lastly, we observed that 87% of the
delegation paths had a total length of three edges (one input
event, one handoff event, and one sensor operation request).
The remaining 13% of the delegation paths had a maximum
length of four edges (one additional handoff event), which
further supports our claim that we can hold events without
penalizing concurrency of such events.
B. Backward Compatibility Analysis
To verify that ENTRUST is backward compatible with exist-
ing programs, we used the Compatibility Test Suite (CTS),14
an automated testing tool released by Google via the AOSP.15
In particular, this analysis verified that possible delays in the
delivery of events introduced by ENTRUST or the change in
scheduling of events did not impact applications’ function-
ality. We tested the compatibility of ENTRUST with 1,000
existing apps, among the top 2,000 most downloaded apps on
Google Play, selected based on those declaring permissions
to access sensitive sensors in their manifest. The experiment
took 19 hours and 45 minutes to complete, and ENTRUST
passed 132,681 tests without crashing the operating system
and without incorrectly blocking any legitimate operation.
Among the 1,000 tested apps, we also included 5 popu-
lar augmented reality multi-player gaming app (InGress,
Poke´mon Go, Parallel Kingdom, Run An Empire,
and Father.io), which typically have a high rate of input
events and are very sensitive to delays. The set of tests
targeting these 5 gaming apps ran for 16 minutes, during
which we continuously observed the device screen to identify
possible issues in terms of responsiveness to input events
or glitches in the rendering of virtual objects on the screen.
However, we did not identify any discernible slowdown, glitch,
or responsiveness issue.
C. Performance Measurements
We performed five micro-benchmarks on a standard An-
droid developer smartphone, the LG Nexus 5X, powered by
1.8GHz hexa-core 64-bit Qualcomm Snapdragon 808 Proces-
sor and Adreno 418 GPU, 2GB of RAM, and 16GB of internal
storage. All of our benchmarks are measured using Android
13Gaps higher than 1,500 ms were excluded because not relevant to the analysis.
14https://source.android.com/compatibility/cts/
15Android Open Source Project - https://source.android.com
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Fig. 8: Overheads for Delegation Graphs Construction, Storage, Eviction, Enforcement, and Two-Level Queue Scheduling.
7.1 Nougat pulled from the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) repository on February 21, 2017.
Delegation Graph Construction – Our first micro-
benchmark of ENTRUST measured the overhead incurred for
constructing delegation graphs of varying sizes. To do this,
we had several programs interacting and generating a handoff-
events chain varying from 1 to 10 handoffs in length and mea-
sured the time to mediate the input event, the handoff event,
and the operation request. We repeated the measurements 100
times. Each set of measurements was preceded by a priming
run to remove any first-run effects. We then took an average of
the middle 8 out of 10 such runs for each number of handoff
events. The results in Figure 8 show that the input mediation
requires an overhead of 10 µs, the handoff event mediation
requires an additional overhead of 4 µs per event handoff,
whereas the operation mediation requires a fixed overhead of
5 µs. The overheads are within our expectations and do not
cause noticeable performance degradation.
Delegation Graph Caching – Our second micro-
benchmark of ENTRUST measures the overhead incurred
for caching delegation graphs constructed at runtime. These
results are intended to measure the overhead introduced by
ENTRUST in the authorization process for both storing a new
delegation graph, as well as evicting from cache a stale one. To
do this, we simulated the creation and eviction of delegation
graphs of different sizes varying from 1 to 16 Kilobytes in
512-byte increments.16 We repeated the measurement 5 times
for each random size and took an average of the middle 3 out
of 5 such runs. The results in Figure 8 show that the storing
of delegation graphs in the cache required a base overhead of
66 µs with an additional 3 µs per 512-byte increment. The
eviction instead required a base overhead of 57 µs with an
additional 2.5 µs for each 512-byte increment.
Delegation Graph Enforcement – Our third micro-
benchmark was designed to compare the unmodified version
of the Android Nougat build for control measurement with a
modified build integrating our ENTRUST features for the del-
egation graph enforcement during authorization. To guarantee
fairness in the comparison between the two systems, we used
16This range was selected based on the size of the delegation graphs created during
our experiments, which should be representative of real scenarios.
the Android UI/Application Exerciser Monkey17 to generate
the same sequence of events for the same set of programs.
For both systems, we measured the total time needed to
authorize a sensor operation as the time from the user input
event to the authorization of the resulting operation request,
corresponding to the last node of the delegation graph for
ENTRUST. We repeated the measurement 100 times for each
system by varying the number of handoff events from 1 to
10. Each set of measurements was preceded by a priming
run to remove any first-run effects. We then took an average
of the middle 8 out of 10 such runs for each number of
handoff events. Figure 8 shows that the overhead introduced by
ENTRUST for the delegation graph enforcement is negligible,
with the highest overhead observed being below 0.02%. Thus,
the slowdown is likely not to be noticeable by users. Indeed,
none of our user study participants raised any concerns about
discernible performance degradation or system slowdown.
Ambiguity Prevention – Our fourth micro-benchmark was
designed to measure the performance implications, in terms of
delayed events, due to the ambiguity prevention mechanism.
For this micro-benchmark, we selected the system UI (User
Interface) process, which is one of the processes receiving the
highest number of user input events, and the media server
process, which receives the highest number of handoff events
and therefore accesses system sensors with higher frequency
than any other process. The time window for the construction
of each delegation path was set to 150 ms. We generated
15,000 user input events with gaps randomly selected in
the range [140-1,500]18 ms. The time window and the gaps
were selected based on data reported in Section VII-A2.
The generated input events caused 2,037 handoff events and
5,252 operation requests targeting system sensors (22,289 total
scheduled events). The collected results indicated a total of 256
delayed events (1.15% of the total events), with a maximum
recorded delay of 9 ms. Thus, the performance overhead
introduced is negligible.
Two-Level Queue Scheduling – Our fifth micro-benchmark
was designed to measure the performance implications, in
17https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
18Notice that to stress test our system, we selected a lower bound that is considerably
lower than the maximum speed at which a user can possibly keep tapping on the screen
(∼210 ms).
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terms of additional delay for event delivery, due to the use of a
two-level queue event scheduling. For this micro-benchmark,
we compared two Android Nougat builds integrating EN-
TRUST with the ambiguity prevention mechanism enabled,
but one of the two builds had the two-level queue scheduling
disabled. We used the Android UI/Application Exerciser Mon-
key to generate the same sequence of events for the same set
of programs to guarantee fairness in the comparison between
the two builds. For this micro-benchmark, we used the same
settings as in our fourth micro-benchmark, but we varied the
number of running applications, starting from 10 up to 100
apps19 with an increment of 10 apps for each new run, for
a total of 10 runs. The collected results reported an average
of 311 delayed events (1.35% of the total events) over the 10
runs, with a maximum recorded additional (compared to the
build with the two-level queue scheduling disabled) delay of 5
ms, as summarized in Figure 8. Therefore, the two-level queue
scheduling introduced only a negligible additional delay. Also,
we found that the maximum recorded delay slightly increased,
at most 1 additional ms every 10 apps, for both builds when
the number of running apps increased.
Memory Requirement – We also recorded the average
cache size required by ENTRUST to store both event mappings
and authorized delegation graphs to be about 5.5 megabytes,
for up to 1,000 programs.20 Therefore, ENTRUST required
about 5.5 kilobytes of memory per program, which is a small
amount of memory when compared to several gigabytes of
storage available in modern systems. We ran the measurement
10 times and then took an average of the middle 8 out of 10
of such runs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Researchers have studied security vulnerabilities related to
Inter-Process Communications (IPCs), such as unauthorized
use of intents, where adversaries can hijack activities and
services by stealing intents, extensively [7], [20], [15], [29],
[28], [2]. In addition, several automated tools for IPC-related
vulnerability analysis have been proposed. ComDroid is a
tool that parses the disassembled applications’ code to an-
alyze intent creation and transition for the identification of
unauthorized intent reception and intent spoofing [7]. Efficient
and Precise ICC discovery (EPICC) is a more comprehensive
static analysis technique for Inter-Component Communication
(ICC)21 calls [30]. It can identify ICC vulnerabilities due to
intents that may be intercepted by malicious programs, or
scenarios where programs expose components that can be
launched via malicious intents. Secure Application INTeraction
(Saint) [32] extends the existing Android security architecture
with policies that would allow programs to have more control
to whom permissions for accessing their interfaces are granted
and used at runtime. Quire provides context in the form of
19We stress tested our system. 21 is the average number of apps users install on
personal smartphones, according to a statista.com review.
20Chosen among the most-downloaded Android apps from the Google Play Store and
including all apps and system services shipped with the stock Android OS.
21Equivalent of IPCs for Android OS.
provenance to programs communicating via Inter-Procedure
Calls (IPC) [10]. It annotates IPCs occurring within a system,
so that the recipient of an IPC request can observe the full call
sequence associated with it, before committing to any security-
relevant decision.
Although effort has been made to analyze and prevent
IPC-related vulnerabilities, none of the proposed approaches
above tackled the problem from our perspective, i.e., instead
of giving control to application developers, we must give
control to users who are the real target for privacy violations
by malicious programs. Toward our perspective, two defense
mechanisms have been proposed by researchers. User-Driven
Access Control [38], [37] proposes the use of access control
gadgets, predefined by the operating systems and embedded
into applications’ code, to limit what operation can be as-
sociated with a specific user input event. AWare [34], [33],
instead, proposes to bind each operation request, targeting
sensitive sensors, to a user input event and obtains explicit
authorization for the combination of operation request, user
input event, and the user interface configuration used to elicit
the event. Unfortunately, none of these mechanisms model
interactions among programs via IPC. They only control how
the user input event is consumed by the program receiving
the user input event, therefore, they are not able to model
input event delegation necessary to prevent the attack vectors
discussed in this paper. Also, differently from prior work on
permission re-delegation [15], we do not rely on an over-
restrictive defense mechanism that totally forbids permission
re-delegation. This mechanism would block necessary interac-
tions between programs even when the interaction is benign
and expected by the user. Lastly, the use of decentralized
information flow control policies, specified by developers and
users [26], [27], requires the use of default-allow policies
to ensure compatibility with legacy applications. However,
a default-allow policy is unable to provide the same level
of security provided by ENTRUST, which instead enforces a
default-deny policy. Also, ENTRUST does not cause critical
compatibility issues and does not require developers and users
to label sensitive data or manually define per-process policies.
IX. CONCLUSION
While a collaborative model allows the creation of useful,
rich, and creative applications, it also introduces new attack
vectors that can be exploited by adversaries. We have pre-
sented three classes of possible attack vectors exploitable by
malicious programs, and proposed the ENTRUST authorization
system to help mitigate them. ENTRUST demonstrates that it is
possible to prevent programs from abusing the collaborative
model – in the attempt to perform confused deputy, Trojan
horse, or man-in-the-middle attacks – by binding together, in-
put event, handoff events, and sensor operation requests made
by programs, and by requiring an explicit user authorization
for the constructed delegation path.
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